On Friday, February 4, Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) Supt. Craig Abrams was at his command post watching then-Ottawa Police Chief Peter Sloly speak to reporters on live television.
It was the eve of what was expected to be a second weekend of chaos in the capital, with hundreds, perhaps thousands, of anti-vaccine and anti-government protesters set to descend on the city to join those already camped out downtown, creating the that Sloly. described as an increasingly volatile and potentially dangerous environment.
What really caught Abrams’ ear was Sloly’s announcement that, based on “new intelligence gathered in literally the last 24 hours,” police planned to close all the on-ramps to the 417 who were driving to the city.
Ontario Provincial Police Superintendent Craig Abrams testified before the Public Order Emergency Commission in Ottawa on Thursday, October 20. (Sean Kilpatrick/The Canadian Press)
As one of the most senior provincial force officers in the region and the OPP’s strategic commander during last winter’s convoy protest, Abrams was surprised to learn of the plan, especially since the OPP has jurisdiction over both on the freeway and on the ramps that should soon be closed.
Abrams, a 27-year police veteran, knew he didn’t have the time or resources to execute the boss’s plan.
“It caused me great concern,” he said Thursday ahead of the public inquiry into the federal government’s eventual use of the Emergency Act to end the occupation. “It was totally unexpected. [I was] unprepared and unconscious”.
OPP Superintendent Craig Abrams describes police officers yelling “swear” at each other during convoy protest
Abrams says a report he received described police officers yelling insults at each other and indicating that their leaders had lost control.
“That was the boss’s idea”
Abrams texted Ottawa Police Service (OPS) Deputy Chief Steve Bell, who had been behind Sloly during the announcement.
“He indicated there was no new intelligence and there was no plan to close ramps,” Abrams told the commission.
Perplexed, Abrams checked with the OPP’s critical incident commander at the National Capital Region Command Center (NCRCC), where municipal, provincial and federal police pooled their resources.
“They weren’t even notified. That was the boss’s idea,” Abrams said.
OPP officers at a checkpoint on Metcalfe Street on February 19. (Justin Tang/The Canadian Press)
It was just one of many troubling accounts heard at last week’s inquest that illustrated the apparent lack of any practical, cohesive plan to end the nearly two-week siege.
While the real purpose of the commission is to determine whether the decision to invoke the special powers available under the act was justified, the first testimonies and documents put into evidence have also lifted the veil on the confusion, the dysfunction and mistrust that existed among the senior ranks of OPS: an atmosphere that may have contributed to delaying any effective police response to the crisis.
No plan B, either
Abrams testified that as early as the first weekend, OPP sent a small contingent of law enforcement officers to Ottawa to help OPP regain control, but that on at least one occasion, most of them left sit around the OPS headquarters on Elgin Street without being deployed.
That Monday, when it became clear, as earlier intelligence had warned, that many protesters were digging in instead of going home, the Ottawa police, whose command was unaware or unconcerned about this information, I was struggling to figure out how to do it. with what Sloly already called occupation.
“I just had to assume that Ottawa had the ability to handle what could have been a long-term event, that there had to be a Plan B,” Abrams stated.
He soon discovered that there was none.
A page from Ottawa Police Deputy Chief Trish Ferguson’s notebook, presented as evidence to the Public Order Emergency Commission, describes the police liaison team’s reaction to the arrests on Coventry Road on February 6 “PLT is angry, OPP is gone.” (Commission for Public Order Emergencies)
When Sloly announced a “surge and contain” strategy toward the end of the first week, Abrams, concerned for the safety of his members, balked.
“These were ideas and concepts of what they wanted to happen, but if I didn’t come with a plan, I certainly wouldn’t offer the support of the OPP,” he told the commission. “There had to be a compelling plan for this to happen, and so far I haven’t seen one.”
Repression in Coventry
On 6 February, a Police Liaison Team (PLT) of OPS and OPP officers entered the protest camp on Coventry Road, where there were growing concerns that the stadium car park baseball field is being used as a distribution center for illegal and potentially dangerous fuel. .
The “soft hat” approach had worked in the past to diffuse tense situations, and the PLT had already made limited inroads with organizers. But when some demonstrators began to leave the camp, police officers under the command of Mr. Mark Patterson, the third senior OPS officer to hold the position in three days, walked in and began to charge.
According to OPS Assistant Director Trish Ferguson, who also testified Thursday, Patterson was eager to “get some wins” to show the public that police were taking action.
Instead, the largely unsuccessful crackdown only damaged the tenuous trust that existed between the police and protest leaders, and led to the departure of the PLT from the OPP.
Former Ottawa Police Chief Peter Sloly, right, steps aside to allow Deputy Chief Steve Bell to answer a question at a Feb. 4 news conference. (Justin Tang/The Canadian Press)
“PLT is angry. OPP is gone. Days or a week ago,” Ferguson wrote in his notes, which entered evidence at the commission.
Shortly after this incident, as it became increasingly obvious that the OPP was faltering on its own, senior officers from the OPP, the RCMP and numerous other law enforcement agencies arrived in Ottawa to form an integrated command and develop a workable plan to end the protest.
According to Ferguson, Sloly was unhappy.
“He seemed to suspect why they were here,” he declared. “I think he felt tested.”
The boss “seeks action”
As of February 9, there was still no comprehensive OPS strategy to end the occupation, according to Abrams. That afternoon, the integrated planning team was summoned to another tense meeting on Elgin Street.
“Chief Sloly was looking for action,” Abrams testified.
Patterson drew up a list of “dynamic actions,” one of which was a plan to clear the intersection of Rideau Street and Sussex Drive, where a contingent of uncooperative protesters police intelligence suspected of having ties to bikers and Quebec extremists remained entrenched. The operation was to be done at 11pm that night.
Abrams asked for specifics, such as how they would remove the trucks from the intersection, and Patterson told him that retired OPS officers could be hired to move them away or that military equipment could be used to tow them. Neither option seemed realistic, and Abrams knew the plan, which he described as “two lines on a page,” was tenuous at best.
Parked trucks line the intersection of Rideau Street and MacKenzie Avenue in Ottawa on February 6. A hastily drafted plan by Ottawa police to clear the area a few days later was scrapped, according to testimony this week at the Public Order Emergency Commission. (Reno Patry/CBC)
He was also concerned that police liaison officers had not been brought in to find out if there were children in the trucks and said such tactical operations should never be carried out in the dark.
“I said [Patterson] directly … based on what I’m seeing and what I’ve just heard, you’re never going to see OPP support for any operation tonight or tomorrow,” Abrams said. “I had to ask the questions because it was dangerous for our members. .”
That operation was abandoned and it would take another 11 days to end the occupation. Sloly resigned on February 15.
The commission resumes on Monday, when top OPP and OPS officials will testify, including Bell. Sloly is expected to appear later in the week.